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from Stratfor.com
Summary
Israeli security forces thwarted a suicide attack planned for central Tel Aviv on Feb. 20. In light of an agreement signed by Hamas and Fatah to create a unity government, Hamas is likely trying to demonstrate – with the help of its militant proxies – that it has not compromised its commitment to the Palestinian resistance campaign.
Analysis
Israeli police and Shin Bet agents foiled a plot by Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) to stage a suicide attack in central Tel Aviv on Feb. 20. Acting on intelligence, security forces raised the alert level in Tel Aviv, set up roadblocks, raided a house in Bat Yam, south of Tel Aviv, and arrested several suspects.
According to Israeli intelligence sources, one of the suspects has been extremely cooperative with security officials. The detainee, a Palestinian PIJ member from the West Bank city of Jenin, led officials to a ready-to-use suicide belt and a heavy bag of military-grade explosives that he had left in a dumpster in Rishon Letzion, a suburb of Tel Aviv. The intended target was reportedly the city’s central bus station.
The thwarted suicide attack follows a Jan. 29 attack at a bakery in the Israeli Red Sea resort of Eilat, claimed to have been staged by PIJ, the al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade, and a previously unknown group called the Army of Believers. The location and timing of the Eilat attack strongly suggest that the operation had not gone as planned. The failure of this latest operation in Tel Aviv reveals that the Palestinian groups are encountering a great deal of difficulty in staging suicide attacks in Israel proper. In both the Eilat and Tel Aviv operations, the bombers were smuggled from the West Bank into Israel, where they were supplied with explosives and sent off to carry out the attack.
Instead of suiting up in the Palestinian territories, the bombers in both attacks used improvised explosive devices that were supplied in Israel to avoid detection when they crossed the Israeli border. These extra steps complicate and lengthen the operations, thereby heightening the risk. First, Israeli security forces have a better chance of catching wind of an operation inside Israel and can take pre-emptive measures to prevent the movement of the bomber. Second, the time it takes for the bomber to enter Israel and maneuver through layers of security increases the probability that the bomber will get cold feet and abort the operation, as was likely the case in the Tel Aviv operation.
Though the Eilat and Tel Aviv plots did not prove to be successful, there is a concern in Israeli security and intelligence circles that they could represent the start of a new initiative by Palestinian suicide bombers to target Israel.
Hamas and Fatah recently signed an agreement in Mecca, where the warring parties vowed to work out a power-sharing arrangement and put an end to intra-Palestinian fighting in the territories. Though Hamas took no giant leap toward moderating its militant stance during the Mecca talks, the organization does need to mask any move toward concessions that it is making behind the scenes. By giving the go-ahead to its allies in PIJ, Hamas provides itself with the plausible deniability to proceed with negotiations while preserving its legitimacy as a resistance movement among Palestinian groups. Any movement in these negotiations is likely to be coupled with more suicide attacks in Israel.
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