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The New Face – and Outlook –
of al Qaeda in Iraq

from stratfor.com

Within days of the June 7 airstrike that killed al Qaeda in Iraq leader Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, the jihadist insurgent group announced that Egyptian Abu Ayyub al-Masri had taken over as the group’s operational commander. With an Egyptian as the new leader of al Qaeda’s Iraqi branch, the Iraqi operations will fall in line with the global jihadist network’s overall strategy.

According to Jordanian intelligence, al-Masri was born and raised in Egypt. The name “al-Masri,” which means “the Egyptian,” is a pseudonym for the man whose real name is believed to be Yusuf al-Dardiri. He also goes by Abu Hamza al-Muhajir. In the 1980s, he joined the Egyptian Islamic Jihad (EIJ), where he is reputed to have worked closely with al Qaeda second-in-command Ayman al-Zawahiri, who was a leading EIJ member at the time. In the late 1980s, al-Zawahiri incorporated many EIJ militants into what would become al Qaeda. Along with al-Masri, these new recruits included fellow Egyptian Mohammed Atef, who would eventually become al Qaeda’s main operational commander before his death in a 2001 U.S. airstrike. Another recruit was Saif al-Adel, a former colonel in the Egyptian military and al Qaeda’s senior surviving operational commander. He is believed to be living in Iran.

Egyptians have always played prominent roles in al Qaeda, frequently holding positions of great trust and importance. This can be seen by counting the dead from the Jan. 13 U.S. Predator drone airstrike targeting al-Zawahiri in Damadola, Pakistan, on the Afghan border. Of the four prominent al Qaeda militants killed, two were Egyptian. Before his death in 2001, Atef became Osama bin Laden’s relative when his son married the al Qaeda leader’s daughter. In addition, Mohammed Atta, the leader of the cell that carried out al Qaeda's most important operation – the Sept. 11 attacks – was an Egyptian.

Rather than appearing suddenly upon al-Zarqawi’s death, al-Masri likely had already been tapped to succeed him, and was probably put in place during 2005, when al-Zarqawi and the core al Qaeda leadership were in the midst of a disagreement over how best to conduct the group’s operations in Iraq. The belief among the core al Qaeda leadership, particularly bin Laden, that al-Zarqawi was acting too recklessly caused friction between al Qaeda prime and its Iraqi branch. Bin Laden and al-Zawahiri considered al-Zarqawi’s tactics, particularly his attacks against Shiite mosques, too risky, suggesting such tactics cost him the support of Iraqis and violated Islamic law. Communications between the core leadership and al-Zarqawi emphasized the importance of maintaining his support network in the country to prolong the insurgency. As a result of this friction, the Jordanian-born al-Zarqawi lost some of his prominence in the jihadist insurgency in Iraq.

As a result of al-Zarqawi’s notorious brutality and excesses, the jihadist umbrella organization the Mujahideen Shura Council was formed – effectively putting the brakes on his actions. The council was conceived to encompass al Qaeda in Iraq as well as other jihadist groups in the country – and to put more of an Iraqi face on the jihadist insurgency. This was a demotion for al-Zarqawi, who was relegated to the position of a military commander. The result of this demotion could be seen in a videotape released by al-Zarqawi on April 23, in which he tried to emphasize his relevance and importance to the jihadist insurgency.

Whereas al-Zarqawi was considered a loose cannon by al Qaeda’s leadership, al-Masri, a trusted long-time member who is close to the inner core, can be counted on to ensure the Iraqi operations step in line with the global jihadist network’s overall strategy and ideology. While al Qaeda’s strategy remains global in nature, however, local concerns will continue to drive Iraq’s jihadists’ attitudes and behavior.


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