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The Changing Shape
of the Insurgency in Iraq

from stratfor.com

A suicide truck bomber hit an Iraqi police checkpoint in the volatile town of Al Fallujah on March 10, killing at least 11 people, including five Iraqi police officers. The fate of U.S. soldiers who also man the post is unknown. This latest attack, most likely the work of foreign jihadist insurgents, comes at a time when the number of suicide attacks in Iraq is on the decline.

The insurgency against the U.S.-led coalition and the new Iraqi government is centered in the Sunni-dominated parts of Iraq, primarily the four provinces that make up the “Sunni Triangle” and “Triangle of Death.” In these areas, the insurgency consists primarily of Iraqi nationalists from local Sunni tribes and foreign jihadists led by Abu Musab al-Zarqawi’s network, al Qaeda in Iraq. Other Iraqi jihadist groups are active, notably Jaish Ansar al-Sunnah, which operates primarily in Kurdish-dominated northern Iraq, but the jihadists under al-Zarqawi are responsible for the majority of suicide attacks.

The foreign jihadists enter Iraq from Saudi Arabia, Syria and Jordan. From the borders, members of local tribes in Sunni-dominated Anbar province lead them through a network of safe-houses to their final destination – often in Baghdad, As Samarra, Ar Ramadi or Al Fallujah. The process of getting the volunteers from their home countries to their final destination, known to the U.S. military as the “rat line,” is believed to take about 30 days.

Suicide attacks have declined in Iraq since December 2005. Compared with a year ago, when multiple, coordinated attacks occurred several times a week, the jihadist capability appears greatly diminished. This could be the result of U.S. military pressure and a crackdown in Jordan following the Nov. 9 hotel bombings in Amman. The lack of support for the jihadists from the Sunni tribes, especially in Anbar province, however, probably is the most significant reason for the decline.

The latest suicide attack comes as Iraq’s Sunnis are turning on their former jihadist allies. Since October 2005, fighting between Sunni insurgents and foreign militants has been reported several times in Anbar province, particularly in Al Qaim on the Syrian border – one of the main entry points for jihadists. In Ar Ramadi, which has been a hotbed of the insurgency, local tribal leaders recently said they soon would clear the city of foreign fighters. This cessation of support would account for the decline in suicide bombings; without help from local Sunni tribes, the jihadists would find it difficult to plan attacks and get to their targets inside Iraq.

Most of the victims of jihadist suicide bombings have been civilians – innocent bystanders. This has been especially true since coalition and Iraqi security forces developed tactics and deployed better equipment to protect themselves from the attacks. With the momentum of the political process increasing, the leaders of the Sunni tribes in Anbar could have determined that they can gain more on the political front by constricting jihadist operations than by supporting suicide bombers on the military front. As the political process becomes increasingly important to them, the Sunni tribes have realized that the jihadists’ marginal usefulness is decreasing – given the difference in their ultimate objectives – and that eventually the jihadists will pose a threat to them.

Since spring 2005, the U.S. military, often in conjunction with Iraqi forces, has conducted a series of offensive operations along the Euphrates River in Anbar province intended to shut down the rat line. The operations, however, would stem the flow of foreign fighters only as long as they lasted. Beginning in the summer, then, the U.S. military increased the frequency of the offensives in an effort to keep near-constant pressure on the jihadists and their Sunni allies in the months leading up to the Dec. 15 elections. Although the increased operational tempo taxed U.S. forces in the area, it wore on the insurgents as well.

The crackdown on jihadists in Jordan following the Nov. 9 suicide bombings – carried out by members of al-Zarqawi’s network – also could be complicating al-Zarqawi’s efforts to shore up his ranks. With the Jordanian General Intelligence Directorate clamping down on traffic in and out of Iraq, that alternative route through Anbar province would now be compromised.

Although fighting in Iraq has claimed hundreds of lives since the Feb. 22 bombing of the Shiite Golden Mosque in As Samarra and attacks against coalition and Iraqi security forces continue, the shape of the insurgency could be changing. Should subsequent political and military developments lead the Sunnis to believe they have more to gain by unleashing the jihadists again, however, suicide attacks could increase.


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