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from Stratfor.com
Summary
U.S. President George W. Bush and Australian Prime Minister John Howard signed the Defense Trade Cooperation Treaty on Sept. 5, ahead of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation summit in Sydney on Sept. 8-9. This agreement indicates Canberra’s ever-growing importance to Washington.
Analysis
The United States and Australia signed the Defense Trade Cooperation Treaty on Sept. 5, ahead of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit in Sydney on Sept. 8-9. The agreement is similar to one London and Washington signed June 27. The treaty, a small piece of a bigger picture, illustrates Australia’s increasing prominence in U.S. strategic thinking – a prominence that will continue to grow until Australia is on par with the United Kingdom as a U.S. ally.
In the long run, the treaty eases serious bureaucratic frictions to military sales and cooperation in the industrial sector (such as export licenses, of which the United States had to approve more than 2,300 in 2006 for Australia alone) and will pay big dividends not only for the Australian military but also for the country’s domestic defense firms. Canberra fully intends to leverage this closer legal standing in order to secure its own regional military dominance.
East Asia’s growing importance in U.S. strategic thinking is nothing new. But a culmination of events over the last decade (combined with a very distracting Middle East) has concerned Washington enough to accelerate this defense cooperation. In recent years, the region has seen the following developments:
- China’s acquisition of energy assets in the region (e.g., uranium in Australia and iron ore mines in Cambodia);
- China’s creeping influence over the South Pacific region, particularly through checkbook diplomacy, post-coup aid to Fiji, and China’s naval aspirations;
- Australia’s failure to protect/uphold democratically elected governments in the region, as seen in Fiji’s December 2006 coup;
- The evolution of systems established by the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) – such as ASEAN Plus Three (ASEAN, China, Japan and South Korea) and the East Asia Summit – meant not only to exclude the United States but also to bend larger powers (including Washington) to Asia’s desires, instead of vice versa; and
- Russia’s emerging focus on the Far East.
The recent encroachment of Chinese and Russian influence across East Asia has reminded the United States of the fierce competition for dominance in the region. As the world’s center of gravity continues to shift away from Europe, other allies will become increasingly significant for Washington. And because of a striking parallel, the two countries Washington recently signed defense accords with can serve similar purposes in their respective regions.
The United Kingdom is, and long has been, the linchpin for the United States in Western Eurasia. Its geographic isolation from continental Europe has insulated it from – but nevertheless involved it in – the politics and the balance of power there. This combination of insulation and involvement makes London the perfect bridge between continental Europe and Washington. Meanwhile, strategically, the British Isles remain the crucial beachhead into the region. Combined with the close cultural and historic ties between the United Kingdom and the United States and a functional independent economy, the continued close relationship is almost inevitable.
Australia has just this balance in the trendy new Asia-Pacific neighborhood. Culturally closer to the United States than any other Pacific Rim nation – perhaps even more so than Canada – its economy is robust but distinct from the East Asian economies, giving it at once insulation and influence. Its geographic standoff distance is strategically compelling, and it is hoped that Canberra’s ability to manage places like East Timor can be honed and expanded.
Washington will continue to foster a close relationship with Japan, and the U.S. trilateral defense focus that encompasses both Tokyo and Canberra remains the cornerstone of U.S. involvement in the region. But Japan’s far more tangible economic competition and cultural differences leave no doubt in Washington’s mind that its long-term interests are far more aligned with Canberra than with Tokyo. The ties that bind these two alliances will reflect this preference.
While such close ties with Washington are costly for Howard in a domestic political sense, the alignment of U.S. and Australian geopolitical interests transcends both Washington’s White House and Canberra’s Lodge. No matter who holds office, Australia will continue to expand its influence across its periphery, and the United States will encourage it. An Australia truly empowered to conduct business in its periphery not only as it sees fit but also with U.S. backing could be a force to reckon with.
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