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from stratfor.com
Summary
The six-party talks on North Korea’s nuclear program are set to resume Feb. 8 in Beijing. While the outcome of such sessions is never clear in advance, there are indications that North Korea and the United States have reached a tentative agreement to take concrete steps toward resolving the nuclear issue. A shift in U.S. negotiating patterns to better fit with the North Korean negotiating style has led to this possibility.
Analysis
Representatives from the United States and North Korea, along with Russia, China, Japan and South Korea, will meet Feb. 8 in Beijing for the next round of talks over North Korea’s nuclear program. This is the second session of the so-called six-party talks since North Korea’s October 2006 nuclear test. As the participants gear up for these meetings, a sense of cautious optimism prevails – leading to a more upbeat mood than seen at most of the previous sessions.
Though the nuclear negotiations’ outcome is never clear in advance, the key items on the table at this round already have been circulating through the diplomatic community, unofficial channels and in the press. The basic agreement to be discussed in Beijing is the suspension of activity at North Korea’s Yongbyon nuclear reactor in return for heavy fuel oil aid from the United States and other members of the six-party process. Though many more details will emerge, these two concrete steps will form the core of the negotiating session.
In looking at these negotiations, a few things should be kept in mind. First, North Korea, not the United States, initiates nuclear crises. Pyongyang uses these crises to ensure regime survival and to gain leverage with the United States, China and its other neighbors. This tactic has been used repeatedly since the early 1990s, when North Korea’s erstwhile sponsors, Russia and China, turned their attention to economic relations with the West (and South Korea), rather than maintaining their socialist little brother. For Pyongyang, then, there might not be any real motivation to bring a conclusive end to the series of crises – unless North Korea’s sense of national security substantially changes.
The short-term goal of the negotiations is to keep North Korea’s neighbors and the United States off balance and divided while putting North Korea at the center of attention. This lets Pyongyang manipulate the differences in the national interests and political persuasions of the various players, and thus reduce the risk of military action while increasing the chances of economic and energy assistance. Though it seems counterintuitive, the plan has proved quite functional for more than a decade. Despite expectations, the North Korean regime has not collapsed – in fact, it remains firmly entrenched. And it intends to stay that way.
North Korea has delayed the resumption of six-party talks since the 2005 decision by the U.S. Treasury Department to impose Section 311 of the Patriot Act on Banco Delta Asia (BDA), a Macau-based bank accused of complicity with North Korean laundering of counterfeit money. Though the actual amount locked down by the action was small (around $24 million), the real impact came when the Treasury Department’s Financial Crimes Enforcement Network blocked U.S. banks from doing business with BDA. This triggered a domino effect of foreign banks throughout Asia, cutting off their North Korean accounts for fear of similar U.S. action. Both legitimate and illegitimate North Korean bank accounts were suddenly closed, and service to North Korean businesses and those doing business with North Korea was curtailed.
Pyongyang finally agreed to resume six-party nuclear talks in December 2006 after initial negotiations with the U.S. Treasury Department. Even then, the December talks dealt only with the BDA issue. Since December, there have been further meetings between North Korea and U.S. Deputy Assistant Treasury Secretary Daniel Glaser, with rumors suggesting that half of the impounded $24 million could be released and other banking avenues might be opened for North Korea. With this out of the way, Pyongyang now is preparing to make a show of progress on the nuclear front, offering to shut down Yongbyon (but not dismantle it), reactivate the cameras put in place by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and invite IAEA inspectors back. In return, Pyongyang expects the banking sanctions issue to be resolved and for the United States to resume shipments of heavy fuel oil to North Korea.
The apparent change in the North Korean position does not mean Pyongyang is backing down or preparing to abandon its nuclear program – far from it. The nuclear program has always served as a path toward negotiations – a bargaining chip North Korea has little intention of ever truly abandoning, particularly after the October nuclear test. Instead, restarting the negotiation process now offers North Korea additional leverage, and could influence policy decisions in other concerned states.
Negotiations add strength to U.S. and South Korean arguments that communication and cooperation are better than demands and force in dealing with North Korea. This keeps North Korea in the game and allows it to keep stringing Washington, Seoul and Tokyo along with the hope that maybe the next round of talks will produce positive results. This also affects the South Korean political field, where posturing for the country’s December presidential elections is in full swing. Pyongyang wants to increase the attractiveness of the south’s more progressive political parties, while painting the opposition Grand National Party as likely to significantly undermine the path to stability in East Asia.
A final settlement is not in the works. Instead, Pyongyang is planning a new round of progress. Washington seems aware of this, and the chief U.S. negotiator has suggested that concrete progress must be achieved in each round of talks for the meetings to continue, and that an overall settlement must be in place by early 2008 – less than a year ahead of the next U.S. presidential elections. Nonetheless, even the U.S. side has suggested that this round holds a higher chance for progress.
One factor that has contributed to the slightly elevated (though still reserved) expectations for this round of talks is the expansion of pre-talks between the United States and North Korea, as well as several other bilateral discussions among the various parties. All negotiations with North Korea face an inherent problem before the parties even sit down at the table: North Korean negotiators are not negotiators at all, but simply come with a prearranged set of demands and a very narrow set of acceptable outcomes. Put simply, they have little room to maneuver, and do not have the authority to make the necessary compromises needed in difficult negotiations.
The North Korean decision-making process is still extremely top-heavy. All critical decisions must be made at the level of Kim Jong Il. While diplomats and representatives of the state are sent abroad for discussions, their room to compromise is extremely constrained. They simply go out to put forward the latest proposals from Pyongyang, hear counterproposals and send all of this information back to the capital.
This has happened during previous multilateral forums, with North Korean negotiators cabling back to Pyongyang each afternoon or evening and coming in the next day with a new set of requirements, limits and expectations. But for this round of talks, U.S. and North Korean negotiators have been holding several rounds of bilateral pre-meetings. There has been extensive diplomatic contact between Washington and Pyongyang, Washington and Beijing, Pyongyang and Beijing, Pyongyang and Moscow and – to a lesser extent – with these players and representatives from South Korea and Japan. In addition, each side has released trial balloons and leaked its limits and openings to various proposals through semiofficial and unofficial channels.
Coming into this round, then, there has been plenty of time for each party to prepare for the others’ offers and counteroffers, and for North Korea and the United States to refine their respective positions – with authority from Pyongyang. Though this does not guarantee results, it does substantially improve the prospects for progress. In the end, though, North Korean decisions are made at the top. Like the 1994 talks between Jimmy Carter and former North Korean President Kim Il Sung, the potential for major shifts in policy and direction resides only with the supreme leadership.
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