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from Stratfor.com
Prior to the rise of the Shia in Iraq, Hezbollah – as a radical Shiite
Islamist organization – was Iran’s main asset in the Arab world. In
fact, it likely will continue to be used by Tehran as a key tool for
furthering Iranian geopolitical interests in the region, until such time
as Shiite power has been consolidated in Baghdad and Iran’s interests
there secured.
In its earliest days, Hezbollah was a classic militant organization –
the creation of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), the elite
unit of the Iranian military. It was founded as a way to export the
ideals of Ayatollah Ruholla Khomeini’s Islamic revolution to the Shiite
community of Lebanon, and served as a model for follow-on organizations
(some even using the same name) in other Arab states. It did not take
long, however, for Hezbollah to emerge in Lebanon as a guerrilla
movement, whose fighters were trained in conventional military tactics.
In the mid-1980s, Iran’s premier intelligence agency, the Ministry of
Intelligence and Security (MOIS), assumed the task of managing Tehran’s
militant assets – not just in the Middle East but in other parts of the
world as well. This allowed the Iranians, through a special unit within
MOIS, to strike at Israeli interests in places as diverse as Latin
America and Southeast Asia.
The relationship between MOIS and Hezbollah remains a subject worthy of
study in light of the current situation in Lebanon. Of course, Iran has
been Hezbollah’s chief source of funding and weapons over the years, and
the Iranians continue to supply extensive training in weapons, tactics,
communications, surveillance and other methods to the militant wing of
Hezbollah in Lebanon. The relationship is sufficiently close that the
Hezbollah branch in Iran proper recently declared it would unleash
militant attacks against Israelis and Americans around the world if
given the order by Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. (Tehran
insists that Hezbollah is not an arm of official policy.)
We have previously discussed the possibility that Hezbollah might be
moved to seize hostages or engage in other militant acts, given the
pressure the Israelis now are bringing to bear. There is some question,
of course, as to whether Iran might be involved in future militant
operations – and if so, what assets it might use and the modalities
that would apply.
An Organizational Model
There is a division of labor of sorts in the way that Iran manages its
foreign assets: The IRGC (which is led by a professional military
officer with strong ideological credentials as an Islamist) oversees the
Lebanese Hezbollah, while MOIS (which almost always is headed by a
cleric) manages militant operatives and groups in other parts of the
Muslim world – Afghanistan, Pakistan, Azerbaijan, India. Moreover, MOIS
also maintains contacts among the Shiite immigrant populations in
non-Muslim countries, including those in the West.
It also is important to note that radical Shiite Islamist ideology is
only one factor that shapes Tehran’s decisions. Ethnicity and
nationalism also play an important role in Iran’s dealings with Shiite
allies of Arab, South Asian and other descent. The Persians claim a rich
cultural heritage, which they view as superior to that of the Arabs.
This attitude impacts the level of trust and cooperation between the
Iranians and other Shiite groups – including Hezbollah – when it comes
to sensitive international operations. It is little wonder, then, that
the Lebanese organization’s sphere of operations does not extend much
beyond the Levant.
It follows that Hezbollah is a useful tool for Iran in its dealings with
Israel, but in few other areas. However, Iranian intelligence has
cultivated numerous groups that can serve its interests in other parts
of the world, and it maintains contact with these groups through MOIS
operatives
placed in diplomatic posts.
A History of Cooperation
Though it has been many years since Hezbollah carried out significant
attacks beyond the Middle East, the participation of MOIS agents in some
of those attacks is worthy of note. Investigations into the 1988
hijacking of Kuwait Airways Flight 422 out of Bangkok and two bombings
in Buenos Aires – in 1992 and 1994 – both revealed involvement by
MOIS, coordinating with local Hezbollah operatives. However, to provide
plausible deniability, the hijacking and bomb teams were deployed from
outside the targeted country; the assets in place were used to conduct
preoperational surveillance on potential targets.
Up close, what this would mean is that the MOIS officer at the Iranian
embassy in the target country or city would maintain close contact with
the Hezbollah cells in his area or responsibility. Given the rules of
intelligence work, an “official asset” like a diplomat is usually under
suspicion and surveillance as an intelligence officer (or IO);
therefore, less-prominent Hezbollah members can be used to case
potential targets. In a situation where a MOIS agent is believed to be
under such tight surveillance that he cannot function effectively, the
Iranians might call on the services of a clandestine MOIS agent instead.
In the case of the 1992 bombing of the Israeli embassy in Buenos Aires,
the MOIS officer was the Iranian cultural attache, who oversaw the
operation from the safety of his embassy office. The Argentines
eventually declared seven embassy employees as “persona non grata” due
to suspected connections to the bombing.
Upon receiving a “go” order for an operation – such as assassinations
of Iranian dissidents or the kidnappings of Western diplomatic and
intelligence personnel (for instance, CIA station chief William F.
Buckley in 1984 and U.S. Marine Lt. Col. William R. Higgins in 1988) –
activity levels at the embassy spike. The role of MOIS frequently would
be to provide the cash or supply weapons or materials needed for an
attack carried out by its “militant assets.” In some countries, such as
Britain (where Hezbollah bombed a Jewish charity in 1994), it can be
difficult to obtain items like blasting caps and explosives; these can
be supplied with the protection of a diplomatic pouch.
Many MOIS intelligence operatives have been educated in the United
States or in Britain, wear nice suits, are multilingual and move easily
in Western social circles – unlike the IRGC operatives in Lebanon, who,
socially speaking, are rougher around the edges. The combination of
their brains and Hezbollah’s willingness to pursue martyrdom can produce
highly formidable capabilities.
With Hezbollah under attack in Lebanon and Iran unable to send
significant reinforcements, there is some possibility that Hezbollah
might resort to staging an attack abroad as a way of countering the
Israeli assault. If so, it is highly likely that operatives already are
on the move; the organization has been known to use “off the shelf”
operational plans in the past, and its targeting information and
surveillance would need to be updated – regardless of whether an order
to strike is actually issued. It is reasonable to believe that Hezbollah
would find it advantageous to coordinate with MOIS again, as in past
operations. Whether the Iranians would see events through the same lens,
however, is much less clear. Tehran might cooperate in an attack only if
it is willing to seriously escalate the current conflict in the Middle
East – which, given its many interests in the region, does not appear
so far to be the case.
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